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CHAPTER ONE: SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND THE STATE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES In its contemporary usage, the term "social engineering" has become virtually synonymous with elitism, and with attempts by liberal academics to foist their vision of what society should look like upon a general public that wavers between being compliant and unsuspecting on the one hand, and openly skeptical and resentful of them on the other. When most people hear the term social engineering, it conjures up images of social scientists (particularly those at Northern, elite, ivy league universities) with their entourage of young, fawning, idealistic student admirers attempting to promote (if not impose) their ideals about how our society should be organized. Invariably, these ideals have a closer association with the ideological left. And, this is the perspective that has come to dominate the social sciences. In addition to describing themselves as liberals, most social scientists will describe themselves as either "progressives" or "humanists." Due to the fact that there tends to be considerable overlap in the values and world views associated with the ideologies of liberalism, progressivism and humanism, these labels can be applied somewhat interchangeably. Collectively, these belief systems form an ideological complex that is more closely associated with what we might call the "left" pole of human nature. The values and ideals that collectively influence the world views of those who define themselves as either liberals, progressives or humanists provide the fundamental basis for the contemporary social engineering project.

Because most social scientists see themselves as either liberals, progressives or humanists, the social sciences (and the field of sociology in particular) have come to be much more closely associated with the ideological left. Yet, we should not immediately infer that there is anything wrong with the social sciences having an ideological bias that favors the left. If the more "objective" behavioral sciences have been revealing knowledge about human nature that would unconditionally support the left, then a social science which is skewed to the ideological left would be justified. But, this is not the case. The behavioral sciences have been revealing a picture of human nature that is far less rosy and charitable than most liberal-progressive-humanists would like to believe. In fact, the picture of human nature that is emerging from the behavioral sciences poses a direct challenge to the social sciences, and to certain liberal-progressive ideals, at a number of critical points.

Even as the picture of human nature that is coming into view as a result of advances in the behavioral sciences poses a fundamental challenge to the liberal-humanistic view of the world, it also challenges aspects of the conservative world view. Specifically, the behavioral sciences are revealing a view of human nature that is more diverse, complex and ideologically eclectic than either liberals or conservatives ever imagined. This view of human nature does not consistently support either liberal or conservative ideals but tends to support a much more diverse and "synthetic" set of ideals. Although this emergent view of human nature presents significant challenges for the conservative world view, in this text, we will be primarily concerned with the challenges it presents for the liberal perspective, as this is the perspective that has come to dominate the social sciences, and which forms the foundations for the contemporary social engineering project.

The fact that social scientists continue to defend their liberal-humanist ideals is not the result of some malevolent intent to subvert truth on their part. Rather, most social scientists are simply unaware of how the more recent findings in the behavioral sciences pose a challenge to their ideals. And even if they have knowledge that would threaten their ideals, most of them continue to genuinely believe that if society were just based on their ideals, that everyone would be better off. In the genuine and self-righteous belief that they are doing something good, they are only attempting to make society conform more closely to their ideas of what "a good society" should look like. But, much like Marx before them, social scientists (mainly sociologists, anthropologists, and, to a lesser extent, some political scientists) are still working with a picture of human nature that is highly inaccurate. As a result, their ideas of what "a good society" should look like are at odds with human nature at important points.

Because the picture of human nature that is now being revealed by the behavioral sciences would tend to support ideals that are more diverse, eclectic or synthetic than the principles of liberalism, they present a fundamental challenge to the ideals of most social scientists. Because they have so much invested in their own view of the world, and because this view has dominated the social sciences for so long, social scientists will be unlikely to relinquish their ideals, even when the behavioral sciences produce clear evidence that these ideals are in conflict with that alternative set of ideals which could be logically extrapolated from what the behavioral sciences are now revealing about human nature. As a result, the social scientist's view of the world is likely to remain skewed to the ideological left, at least until such time as these "sciences" can be purged. In the meantime, and of greater immediate concern to us here, is the fact that in the degree that there is "ideological distance" between human nature as it actually exists (and as it is being revealed by the behavioral sciences) and the ideals that any group (like social scientists) attempts to impose upon it, the resulting social order will tend to be unstable and unsustainable.

Mainly from personal observations and experience, many in the general public have been able to independently reach many of the same conclusions about human nature that are now being reached in the behavioral sciences. And, on the basis of what they know to be true about human nature from personal experience and observations, an ever increasing number of Americans have begun to realize how the contemporary social engineering project is misguided, unrealistic, and illegitimate. The public's growing realization of how the contemporary social engineering project is at odds with certain elements of human nature has contributed to the further stigmatization of the term "social engineering." But even though "social engineering" has justifiably become a term of derision as it is used in connection with the attempts by contemporary social engineers to remake our society to conform more closely with their ideals (the contemporary social engineering project), the term "social engineering" deserves to be understood in a more positive light. For there is a legitimate place for attempts to remake social institutions when they are substantially at odds with important elements of human nature. There is a legitimate place for attempts to bring human institutions into closer accord with human nature as it actually exists. This is "social engineering" legitimately understood. But, because it is taking our social institutions further away from human nature as it actually exists, rather than bringing them closer to it, and because it represents an attempt to make human society conform more closely with some set of "artificial ideals" or a set of ideals which are not based on an accurate understanding of human nature, the contemporary social engineering project is not legitimate.

Legitimately understood and practiced (and as I use the term in reference to this work), the term "social engineering" refers to attempts to bring human institutions, forms of social organization and societies into closer accord with predominating or the "more representative" elements of human nature, with which existing forms may be in conflict. That is, it refers to attempts to organize society on the basis of principles of natural law, or principles that can be extrapolated directly from a more accurate and comprehensive view of human nature. In other words, the only legitimate attempts to alter existing forms of human social organization are those that would attempt to bring these forms into closer accord with what the behavioral sciences are revealing to be true of human nature. By extension, as I use the term social engineering in connection with this work, I am referring to "a deliberate attempt to bring our society into closer accord with a rational system of natural law, or a system of natural law that is based on principles that have been extrapolated directly from the new understanding of human nature that is emerging from the behavioral sciences." At a more formal level, social engineering can be defined as "a deliberate attempt to change the core beliefs of a society (including the values, attitudes and beliefs which form the ideological superstructure of a society) to make them more functional.

Understandably, because of the way that their unique life experiences interact with their unique temperamental propensities, people may tend to form somewhat different ideas about what the "best" or most functional set of core values, attitudes and beliefs should look like. Hence, some objective standards and methods must be used to determine those ideals that would in fact be most consistent with human interests over the longer term, those that would tend to maximize human survivability over the longer term, and those which can be logically extrapolated from a true understanding of human nature as it exists at the aggregate level. As it turns out, these are all the same..

In attempting to identify prime principles for organizing and operating human societies, the process of evolution has already done most of the work for us. All that we need to do is to correctly interpret the message that is contained in our evolutionary legacy. All we need to do is to form a more accurate and comprehensive picture of our own nature in the context of its evolutionary origins and functions. From this point it becomes a relatively simple exercise to extrapolate "optimal principles" or ideals for organizing human societies. That is to say, if we understand the various elements of human nature in the context of their evolutionary origins and functions, it will point us in the general direction of principles we need to organize human societies in a way that will be best, most functional, and most conducive to human survivability. Hence, an accurate understanding of human nature as it really exists (as opposed to the ideals of how we might like it to be) should be the primary reference point for the values and ideals on which our societies are based.

Limitations of the Social Science Perspective
Can we think of a better way to organize our societies? Most contemporary social scientists think they have found a way. They insist that if we would only follow their advice and model our societies along lines that coincide more closely with their values and ideals, things would be better for us all. This is what "contemporary" social engineering (as distinguished from social engineering more correctly and legitimately understood, and as outlined in this book) is all about. It is about attempts by our self appointed social engineers to remake our societies to conform more closely with their ideals. In theory, there might be nothing wrong with this, if our contemporary social engineers had an essentially accurate picture of human nature to work with, and if they were merely attempting to make our social institutions conform more closely to a set of values and ideals which could be logically extrapolated from a correct understanding of human nature. But, this is not the case.

The vast majority of social scientists, and sociologists in particular, hold values and ideals which place them solidly on the ideological left. This is not just a result of their professional training and socialization, but it is also most likely a result of the fact that, like many other professional groups, social scientists have certain "cognitive and temperamental" predispositions that make them unrepresentative of the general population, or unrepresentative of human beings "at the aggregate level." And, whenever such an unrepresentative group of individuals attempts to extrapolate an understanding of human nature more generally from its own nature, it will necessarily end up with a distorted picture of it.

As a result of their ideologically distorted and lopsided understanding of human nature, social scientists have tended to favor certain causative models for understanding and explaining social phenomena and individual behavior. In particular, they tend to favor causative models that assign primary importance to the influence of socialization as a determinant of individual and social behavior. These models totally exclude considerations of any innate influences on either individual or social behavior. If social scientists had to incorporate variables related to human nature into their models, practicing their "science" would become much more difficult. So, to avoid such difficulties, they just exclude this category of variables from their analysis altogether. In many cases, social scientists exclude such variables from their analysis because they don't have the knowledge of cognitive, affective and behavioral influences, predispositions or tendencies that would allow them to form a more complete and accurate picture of human nature. And, because the knowledge of human nature that is now coming into view as a result of advances in the behavioral sciences might pose a threat to some of their ideals, many social scientists will simply discount or ignore this knowledge, if they should accidentally become aware of it. In lieu of this knowledge, they just fall back on their ideals about the way they think man "should behave."

Their lop-sided focus on a more narrow set of variables to the near total exclusion of the other variables serves some very important ideological functions for social scientists. First, it allows social scientists to ignore those aspects of human nature that may be in conflict with their ideals. Secondly, it allows them to discount the role that innate differences can play in determining individual outcomes. Third, it allows them to simplify their models for understanding and explaining human society and behavior. Such a lop-sided focus on a more narrow set of variables will also tend to skew both the social phenomena that social scientists focus their attention on, and it will tend to color the conclusions that they reach.

In addition to failing to incorporate the cognitive, affective and behavioral tendencies that constitute human nature into their models for understanding and explaining human behavior, social scientists do not even take into account the full range of important "environmental variables" that should occupy a place of central importance in their analysis of man and his society. In particular, they neglect those variables related to the "differential functionality" of different values, attitudes and beliefs. Because they are so intimately related to such things as "receptivity to learning" and "need for cognition" such variables can play a critical role in determining outcomes at both the individual and societal levels. Once again, social scientists tend to exclude such variables from their analysis primarily for ideological reasons, or because their inclusion would come into conflict with their ideals.

Perhaps the main reason that social scientists exclude the "differential functionality" of different value systems from their analysis is that if they were to focus on such variables, it would threaten to undermine one of the main pillars of their normative training, namely, the idea that one should not be "judgmental" about human values and value systems more generally. Ostensibly, social scientists don't want to be "judgmental" in order to maintain the appearance of objectivity as "scientists" and in order not to appear ethnocentric. But, in the process of trying to achieve their "objectivity" they throw the baby out with the bath water. By failing to exercise "judgment" where it can be legitimately exercised, they are ignoring some of the most important determinants of what makes individuals turn out the way they do, and what makes them behave the way they do. They are ignoring as well some of the most important reasons why certain individuals and societies have become more successful than others.

Again, the ideal of being "non-judgmental" about the different value systems that people hold has come to occupy a central place in the professional ethos of social scientists. To social scientists, being neutral and not making judgments about the relative worth of different values systems that people hold (such as those which would be entailed in the belief that some value systems could function better than others in absolute terms) is just part of "being objective." Actually, social scientists are mistaken in their assumption that by deliberately excluding certain information and by deliberately failing to make such judgments, they are being more objective. Deliberately excluding certain information and deliberately failing to make determinations of what is most functional or what works best in terms of ultimate human purposes (such as the enhancement of survivability) is not being more objective. Rather, in defense of their ideals, social scientists have simply chosen to ignore how different values and value systems function, either at the individual or societal levels. Properly, and in order to do good social science, social scientists should focus on such things. They should want to include as many facts and variables in their analysis as possible (including facts about how different values and beliefs function) rather than deliberately excluding such variables from analysis because they fear that their inclusion might "give the appearance" that they are not being objective.

In order to do good social science, determining how different values and belief systems function should be a primary focus of social science research. By considering how different values and value systems function, and how they either help to achieve, or interfere with the achievement of, some ultimate or universally valued human ends (goals that tend to be valued in all human societies, such as the maximization of survivability) one would come closer to doing good science, or the kind of science that would be more likely to yield practical benefits for humanity. This kind of practical science "requires" being judgmental about ultimate human purposes. And, it even requires being judgmental about more proximate human purposes, such as how a particular value or value system functions in relation to other values and value systems.

The social scientist's commitment to the value of being non-judgmental, ostensibly as a measure designed to help them maintain their objectivity, becomes the logical corollary of a belief in cultural and moral relativism. According to the ideal of cultural and moral relativism, no cultural or moral system is better or more functional than any others in any absolute sense. Differences between cultural and value systems are relative, because there is no absolute basis from which to judge the worth of different cultural or value systems. According to the social scientist's view of the world, if they were to attempt to judge the relative worth of different cultural and moral systems, it would pose a threat to their "objectivity" or it would give the appearance that they were being ethnocentric. Social scientists never seem to consider the possibility that the cultural or value system which led them to think in such "objective" terms in the first place might actually have a higher standing in a more absolute sense, or in relation to some universally valued human purposes. Nor do they seem to consider the possibility that, in the degree that "objectivity" is a valid concept to begin with, it becomes possible to rank cultures and their associated value systems according to their relative ability to achieve certain universally valued human ends. Or, it becomes possible for us to rank cultures and their associated value systems according to how functional they are in absolute terms.

In addition to not wanting to give the appearance of judging other cultures by their own standards, ostensibly as part of an effort to maintain their objectivity, social scientist have also become committed to the principle that everyone is entitled to a certain baseline degree of dignity and respect simply because they are human beings, and regardless of how functional their values and beliefs are. For, attempting to judge other's values and beliefs according to how functional they are merely represents an attempt to apply our own "instrumental" standards to the beliefs and world views of other people, when such people may not value instrumentality as highly as we do. And yet, to a great extent, all cultures must value instrumentality and functionality in their beliefs and values. For, to a large extent, the instrumentality and functionality of their values and beliefs is tied directly to both a people's survivability and their quality of life. And in fact, cultures and peoples are unequal mainly because, for whatever reason, some have been better able to achieve instrumentality and functionality in their system of values and beliefs.

Despite the social scientist's concern with wanting to appear objective and not wanting to judge other peoples and cultures by our own standards, there is actually strong evidence that the values and beliefs people hold can be qualitatively ranked according to universally valid criteria. Or, in other words, there is evidence that a majority of the people in some societies hold values and beliefs that are more functional in absolute terms. There is evidence as well that some societies have been more successful than others precisely because most of their members hold certain values, attitudes and beliefs that are more functional in absolute terms. That is to say, not all people are equal, to the extent that they hold different value and belief systems, and to the extent that these value and belief systems are differentially functional in absolute terms. Many social scientists would seem to have an implicit understanding of such things, but, once again, due to their commitment to the ideals of cultural and moral relativism, egalitarianism, and due to their desire to maintain the "appearance" of objectivity, and not wanting to appear ethnocentric, they are forbidden from acknowledging such things. And yet, behind the scenes, many social scientists would seem to hold out some hope that people from all cultures will be able to independently conclude that certain values and beliefs are better and more functional than others, and that over time, people from all cultures would naturally tend to adopt such values and beliefs without anyone having to explicitly point them out.

Nature Versus Nurture
Unfortunately, and mainly as a consequence of their belief that socialization is an all powerful and an all determining influence on how individuals turn out, social scientists tend to totally discount any role that "human nature" could possibly play in human development. Necessarily, social scientists are led to the conclusion that virtually all problems of society can be reduced to flaws in how people are socialized, and that they can be corrected by simply changing our social arrangements or simply by "engineering" our society. Inevitably, as they understand it, social engineering means attempting to bring society into closer accord with "their " ideals.

By assigning near absolute determinative importance to socialization as an influence on individual development, social scientists are inevitably led to minimize the roles of such things as "personal" responsibility in individual development. Consequently, in many cases where individual failings (either core values derived from differential socialization or temperament) are most responsible for a person's station in life, social scientists will be more inclined to rely on such arguments as "they had a bad childhood" or "they came from a dysfunctional family" or some other excuse which tends to absolve individuals of their responsibility for turning out badly. And, if we attempt to place blame where it belongs in many cases, which is with some inherent flaws of individuals themselves (nature does not produce consistently perfect beings in terms of their temperaments and abilities, and there tends to be some random error) then, in such cases, owing to the near absolute determinative importance which they assign to socialization, social scientists will say that we are "blaming the victim."

Conveniently, social scientists do not have a ready explanation for (and they are reluctant to acknowledge) those many cases where people have been born into very unfavorable circumstances, but have nonetheless been able to rise above these circumstances to achieve success in life. These "differential outcomes" strongly suggest that some innate variables are playing a role in determining why some individuals turn out well (despite having been born into bad circumstances), while others do not. This also suggests that how individuals turn out is not completely the fault of society, or is not completely a function of the circumstances that they were born into. It suggests that despite being born into bad social and economic circumstances, and perhaps due to some genetic influences, a person's values can turn out to be generally positive. Again, social scientists tend to minimize the importance of such variables or they totally exclude such variables from their analysis, out of a desire to appear "objective and value neutral."

Having come to rely so completely on their socially deterministic view of individual development, social scientists would lead us to believe that individuals have little or no control over where society is taking them, and that it is primarily society's fault for taking them in a wrong direction. Yet, by focussing on the overarching role that socialization plays in an individual's development, social scientists have inadvertently made a good point. To the extent that society has "some" control over which normative belief systems individuals are more likely to adopt, mainly by way of its control over the educational apparatus and the popular culture, and to the extent that there are differences in the functionality of belief systems between societies, society must share "part" of the blame for how individuals turn out. To the extent that a society may not be doing all that it could to ensure that individuals form or adopt more functional belief systems, it must share part of the blame for how individuals turn out. To the extent that a society may not be placing the necessary emphasis on those values that would prove most conducive to an individual's success, or to the extent that it does not provide people with an environment that is optimal from the standpoint of their normative development, it must share part of the blame for the individual's failure to achieve a certain level of success. But, the fact that people in a society turn out differently (some are more successful than others) despite having been exposed to the same overarching cultural milieu, still leaves us with the problem of how to explain differences in individual outcomes.

According to the ways of understanding and explaining differential individual outcomes that are now in vogue in the social sciences, individuals are analogous to passengers on a train (i.e. society). They simply climb on board at birth and are driven to a destination by larger social influences over which they have little or no control. Social scientists are inclined to discount and largely ignore the fact that, depending on the values, attitudes and beliefs which they adopt, (and which, admittedly, society will have "some" control over) people have choices; and the choices they make will play a major role in determining their outcomes. Because of this fact, people have some responsibility to "get on the right train" to begin with. That is, they have a personal responsibility to adopt or to internalize that set of values, attitudes and beliefs that would be most conducive to their personal development and success. But, once again, to reach this conclusion would require us to make a "value judgment" about the relative worth of different value systems. In turn, this would suggest that not all value systems are equal, and that some might actually be better or more functional than others. And, in the degree that certain value systems are more typical or representative of certain peoples and cultures, this in turn would suggest that not all peoples and cultures are equal, and that it is possible to assign them a rank according to the relative functionality of their most representative or "modal" values. And being cultural and moral relativists, these are conclusions that most social scientists will not be comfortable with. Again, ostensibly for the purpose of helping them to maintain the "appearance" of objectivity, and not wanting to appear culturally insensitive or biased, they want to avoid making value judgments. They will say that we should not judge others or their value systems by our own standards, even though the possibility exists that our own standards (or for that matter some other set of standards) could be more conducive to individual success and achievement in absolute terms.

Once again, and mainly as a result of their normative training, social scientists are encouraged to adopt a more culturally and morally relativistic point of view. As a general rule and unless their own relativistic values are directly challenged, they don't want to appear to favor one system of values (even though it may have demonstrated greater functionality) over others, because this would give the appearance that they are biased in favor of certain values that predominate in their own culture, or that they ethnocentric. By implication, this would suggest that they are intolerant or critical of other values systems. Yet, once again, there is little escaping the fact that value systems can be graded or ranked according to certain universally valid criteria, and that some value systems will emerge far higher than others in terms of their overall functionality. Similarly, there is no escaping the fact that some values afford individuals substantial advantages in life while others impair their life chances. Correspondingly, there is no escaping the fact that it is primarily the individual's responsibility to identify and adopt those value systems that will give them the best chance of success in life.

To return to the passengers on a train analogy, it is primarily the individual's responsibility to get on the right train to begin with. It is primarily the individual's responsibility to adopt the core values attitudes and beliefs that will be most likely to lead them in the right direction in life, or that set of values attitudes and beliefs which would give them the best chances in life, and which would prove most conducive to their success. Even if society does everything that it can to make the trains run on time, some trains will still lead to less desirable locations than others. Society cannot create circumstances in which all trains lead to the most desirable locations. Social scientists don't like to emphasize such things because, once again, it suggests that values, attitudes and beliefs can be qualitatively ranked, and that some are better than others in absolute terms.

Social Determinism and the Power of Socialization to Override Aspects of Human Nature
To this day, most social scientists are oblivious to findings in the behavioral sciences which clearly indicate that humans have innate cognitive, affective and behavioral tendencies that correspond to what most of us understand as human nature. They are equally oblivious to the fact that there is tension between some of their ideals, and some of what the behavioral sciences have been revealing about human nature. In those few cases where social scientists are willing to acknowledge that some elements of human nature could conflict with their ideals, they will likely fall back on the argument that, if socialization is powerful enough, it can override any aspects of human nature that might be in tension with their ideals. Consequently, they can create a society that conforms more closely to their ideal image of man, and with their humanist ideals in particular. In fact, to a certain extent, man can be made to conform to a set of "artificial ideals" or a set of ideals that have not been extrapolated from a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of human nature; and which are at odds with important elements of human nature.

Social scientists are correct in believing that socialization has considerable power to override or suppress certain natural tendencies. However, what social scientists fail to understand is that a society that is based on "the suppression of elements of human nature in order to realize some set of artificial ideals" will be inherently less stable than one which is more consistent with these elements of human nature to begin with. And it should never be our aim to create a society that is at odds with important elements of human nature, simply in order to demonstrate that it can be done. Rather, our aim should be to create a society that is as closely in accord with natural tendencies as possible. This should be our aim because a society which is based on the denial or suppression of important elements of our nature will not be as stable, robust or as lasting as one that more closely conforms with elements of human nature in the first place.

Again, socialization has some power to create "a kind of man that lives according to certain ideals that are at odds with elements of his own nature." For, to an extent, man is a "synthesis" of both his nature and what we choose to imprint upon his nature by socialization. Therefore, to a certain extent, man is naturally malleable. Consequently, man and human societies can be shaped into all kinds of grotesque and distorted forms, or they can be shaped into forms that are substantially at odds with important aspects of human nature. Such social forms must have a built in propensity for entropy and disorder. So why would anyone want to construct such forms? Do the majority of social scientists and contemporary social engineers just want to prove they can create a society that is based on some set of artificial ideals? Shouldn't' it be our aim to construct our societies in ways that are maximally stable and robust? Shouldn't it be our aim to create a social from which is most consistent with human nature?

As long as the social sciences are dominated by people who have an ideologically polarized view of the world and a ideological agenda, or as long as the social sciences are dominated by people who want to promote ideals that are at odds with important elements of human nature, it is only to be expected that much of what they propose for our society will bear the imprint of this ideology. And, social scientists are in one of the best positions to know the power that socialization has to realize their ideals, over and above the objections of the people, no matter how much these ideals conflict with aspects of human nature. But, what the social scientists fail to recognize is that in the degree that the social form which they succeed in creating is at odds with important aspects of human nature, it will tend to be unstable over time. The form of society that is based on the social scientists' ideals (i.e. humanism and liberal-progressive principles) will not be either maximally stable or robust over the longer term. And, from a more rational and ideologically neutral standpoint, one of the main objectives of social engineering should be to create a social form that is most lasting and most stable.

If our aim is to "engineer" a societal form that is optimally stable and functional, then any "ideals" that we begin with should be extrapolated from an accurate understanding of human nature, rather than simply extrapolated from the feelings (which are a function of their temperamental inclinations) of some group that is not temperamentally or cognitively representative of humanity at large, as is the case with social scientists. A similar charge can be made against those who hold conservative ideals more or less monolithically. Both groups tend to extrapolate their ideals from their dominant feelings, rather than from any comprehensive knowledge of human nature at the aggregate level. As such, both views tend to give a distorted account of human interests

The values and principles we use as a basis for society must be extrapolated from a comprehensive understanding of human nature. And the view of human nature that is now coming into view as a result of advances in the behavioral sciences suggests that the best plan for human society (or the most legitimate basis for social engineering project, should we decide to undertake it) is based on a set of values and ideals which are far more diverse, eclectic and "bi-polar" than the values that currently serve as the basis for the contemporary social engineering project of liberals and humanists. They further suggest that the liberal-progressive humanist's social engineering project (as well as any alternative social engineering project that might be based on principles that are more exclusively associated with conservatism) is based on a distorted, lopsided and idealistic view of human nature.

The Conflict Between the Social Scientist's World View and Human Nature
Social scientists in general, and sociologists in particular, tend to be idealists in the sense that they are strongly committed to a set of ideals, and in the sense that they form a vision of what they think society should look like which is based on these ideals. There would be nothing wrong with their commitment to a set of ideals if these ideals conformed more closely to human nature at the aggregate level. There would be nothing wrong with their ideals if these ideals could be logically extrapolated from some reliable knowledge of human nature. So, at this point, one might ask how have social scientists been able to practice their "science" under the pervasive influence of such ideals?

Because the social sciences tend to be the weakest of the sciences empirically, it has allowed social scientist's ideals to play a larger role in shaping their world views (and in biasing their research) than they might have otherwise. Because the values which form the basis for their world views tends to be so pervasive within their professions, it creates a situation in which others in these professions are not likely to reach conclusions that would challenge these views. Rather, they are more likely to challenge one another's conclusions primarily on non ideological and technical grounds, or on grounds which do not pose a threat to their fundamental humanistic ideals. As a result, the methods that social scientists use, and the conclusions they reach, tend to be mutually reinforcing and confirming. And, their ongoing denial of the role which differential values play in the determination of individual behavior, and their commitment to the tabula resa or "blank slate" view of human nature, further insures that they are able to hold a set of ideals which are at odds with human nature at important points.

To the extent that they are willing to concede that human nature exists at all, social scientists have come to believe it is a reflection of their own predominating values and world views. That is, social scientists have an ideal view of man "as they would like him to be" and which conforms with their humanistic values more generally. Consequently, their vision of what an ideal society would be like is merely a reflection of these ideals. And, given the ability, they would fundamentally alter or "re-engineer" our society, in order to bring it into closer accord with their ideals, hence, the term "social engineering." Once again, there is nothing wrong with attempting to bring a society into closer accordance with a set of ideals, as long as these ideals have been extrapolated from an essentially comprehensive and correct understanding of human nature. But, in the degree that the values and ideals of social scientists are at odds with important aspects of human nature, we should not expect their efforts to bring society into closer accord with these ideals will result in a social form which is stable and lasting. We should not expect any social form which is based on an ideologically lopsided or polarized view of human nature to have any long term stability, as Russia's experiment with a more extreme form of "socialism" (actually state capitalism) has already demonstrated. To be legitimate, and to be successful over the longer term, any attempt at social engineering must be based on a comprehensive and unbiased understanding of human nature as the product of evolutionary experience. It must reflect a total understanding of human nature as a "synthesis of potentially opposing tendencies." It must be based on an understanding of human nature in the context of its evolutionary origins and functions. And, it must reflect human interests at the aggregate level, as opposed to the interests of a particular class, as in the case of ideals which are more exclusively associated with either liberalism or conservatism.

With the help of advances in the behavioral sciences (and even advances in the social sciences themselves to a much lesser extent), we are now beginning to piece together a more accurate picture of human nature. This picture does not consistently support either the liberal-progressive, humanist ideals of social scientists, or the ideals of conservatives. The picture of human nature that is now emerging from the behavioral and neurosciences is neither as soft, charitable or as trusting as the view of man that has become more closely associated with liberal-progressive and humanist ideals, or with the humanist tradition, in its more modern manifestations. Rather, the emergent view of human nature is somewhat more austere, and ideologically eclectic than the view of human nature which tends to support liberal-progressive-humanist ideals. Correspondingly, the ideals which this view of human nature recommends or will tend to support, or the ideals that can be logically extrapolated from it as a reference for the design of human societies, and which we might want to use as a model for any realistic attempts at "social engineering," will tend to be somewhat more austere and ideologically eclectic as well.

To be legitimate, any social engineering project that we could possibly hope to justify or support would need to be backed by an accurate understanding of human nature, as opposed to an ideologically biased view of human nature, such as that which has come to be associated with the liberal-progressive humanists. Such a project would need to be based upon the view of human nature that is now emerging from the behavioral sciences. That is to say, the only set of ideals about human societies which could "legitimately" serve as basis for a social engineering project, or the only set of ideals that could provide a rational justification for such a project, would need to be based on a comprehensive and accurate understanding of human nature. It would have to be based on an understanding of human nature as the product of sometimes harsh evolutionary experience, rather than being based on some ideals about what some might wish were true of human nature. It would have to be based on values drawn from the total range of temperamental essence that man has been endowed with by the process of evolution to enhance his survivability in response to the broad range of conditions that he would be likely to encounter over the course of his evolution.

The view of human nature that is now emerging from the behavioral sciences (as opposed to the more ideal and humanistically inspired view of man that still prevails in the social sciences) is that man has a bi-polar essence. That is, it reflects the fact that man evolved a dual nature, composed of two potentially opposing sets of cognitive capacities and temperamental tendencies that he evolved to enable him to be more survivable across the broad range of extremes that he would face in the natural world. And, various human values are more or less closely associated with one or the other of these poles. By contrast, the view of human nature as well as many of the values that are held in common by those who describe themselves as liberal-progressives and humanists, tends to be much more closely associated with one cognitive and temperamental pole than the other. In other words, their values tend to be "ideologically polarized, unbalanced and lopsided."

Because they hold what is essentially a tabula resa view of human nature, it opens the door for liberal-progressives and humanists to insert their own unrepresentative ideals, or ideals which are more closely associated with the left pole of human temperamental essence. But, in order to reflect the totality of man's cognitive and temperamental essence, or the full range of tendencies that we have been endowed with by the process of evolution in order to maximize our survivability, values and ideals need to be more ideologically eclectic and synthetic. That is to say, because the process of evolution has endowed man with two cognitive and temperamental poles to enhance his survivability in response to a broad range of challenges, (such as those he is now facing), then we should be relying on values and ideals associated with "both" poles as the primary reference points for modeling our societies. In terms that some may be more familiar with, we can think of the basic tendencies that define the bounds of normally occurring human nature as being parallel to the concepts of the "yin and the yang." In our contemporary political context, these tendencies have manifested themselves in the form of two opposing ideologies (i.e. liberalism and conservatism). Synthesis represents the "more completely human" reconciliation of these opposing poles.

The Emergent View of Human Nature as the "Legitimate" Basis for Social Engineering
Until recently, determining the most functional way to arrange human societies and the most functional belief system for human beings more generally has been a largely subjective process. But with recent advances in the behavioral and neurosciences, making this determination now has an objective basis. The principles and ideals that man needs to rely on in order to create a social form that is maximally functional, stable and conducive to human survivability can now be extrapolated directly from the knowledge of human nature that is emerging from the behavioral and neurosciences.

Advances in the behavioral sciences are leading to a completely different picture of human nature from that which continues to dominate the social sciences. Increasingly, the picture which they point to is at odds with the vision of society which predominates in the social sciences and in the field of sociology in particular. Most social scientists exclude such variables as human nature and the role of differential values from their analysis of society and from their explanations of what makes individuals turn out the way they do. Because they tend to narrowly focus on only one side of the equation (environmental determinants), and because they cavalierly dismiss the importance of other major categories of variables (innate influences and influences of differential values) it becomes relatively easy for social scientists to deflect blame for individual failings onto society. It becomes easy for them to attribute individual failings to some generic deficiencies in socialization (which is even more of a personal and familial responsibility than a societal one). In fact, there is a strong tendency for contemporary social engineers (mainly sociologists) to place "sole" responsibility on society for the way that individuals turn out. As a result of such a misplaced emphasis, social scientists tend to minimize the role of individual responsibility, or they tend to deflect attention away from the degree to which individuals are responsible for determining their own outcomes in life. But, if we pay due attention to the other side of the equation as well, it strongly suggests that personal deficiencies (which can have a basis in either innate differences or in environmental influences such as values acquired through primary socialization) often play a major if not a deciding role in determining a person's life chances and their probability of being successful.

By focusing on only one set of factors (society and socialization), and by totally excluding or denying the importance of the other set of variables (innate differences and the differential functionality of values), social scientists' explanatory and causative models end up having a decidedly one sided and ideological quality about them. As a result, their methods and proposed solutions for a variety of social problems take on an unrealistic and ethereal quality as well. This in turn has contributed to the perception that the contemporary social engineering project is idealistic and fundamentally at odds with important elements human nature.

Because they tend to exclude any considerations of human nature from the models they use to understand or explain the operation of human societies, any social engineering project which contemporary social scientists would be likely to endorse must be suspect. Such attempts at social engineering are more likely to be based on some "artificial" set of ideals or some set of ideals that are unrepresentative and at odds with human nature at important points. And it is important to recognize that in the degree that a set of ideals is artificial or at odds with important elements of human nature, any society that is based on these ideals will tend to be unstable in some degree.

The most stable social form is that which is in closest accord with the most important elements of human nature. Depending on the unique challenges that mankind is having to face at a particular point in time, different elements of human nature will tend to support principles, values and ideals that are either more closely associated with the ideological left or the ideological right. And even though the contemporary social engineering project is illegitimate because it is based almost exclusively on values that are more closely associated with the ideological left, some values that are more closely associated with the ideological left will be part of the optimal set of values, just as some values associated with the right will also be part of the optimal set of values, and the most functional ideology. Values associated with both the left and the right will be able to point to something substantive in human nature for their justification. But, when contemporary social engineers attempt to impose a plan for society which is based almost exclusively on ideals that are closely associated with the ideological left, to the near total exclusion of values and ideals that are more closely associated with the ideological right (and which can be extrapolated from knowledge of human nature), this stands out as a major indictment of their social engineering project.

Again, the behavioral sciences are revealing a picture human nature which is more complex than either liberals or conservatives have been able to appreciate at this point. This emergent view of human nature suggests that a more eclectic and synthetic set of values, or a set of values that is drawn from both cognitive and temperamental poles will prove more conducive to human survivability over the longer term than a set of values that has been drawn more exclusively from either one pole or the other. This emergent view of human nature is more diverse and complex than the view of man that has come to be more closely associated with humanist ideals. But, it is also more complex than the view of man which most conservatives hold. Yet, there is no denying that despite the deficiencies of their social engineering project overall, contemporary social engineers have got some parts of the equation right, at least incidentally. And, we have to pay close attention to these parts, even as we must reject the contemporary social engineering project overall for its failure to acknowledge what the behavioral sciences have been revealing about human nature. As I will attempt to illustrate in this work, if it proceeds from a sound basis to begin with, social engineering can be conducted in such a way that it has the potential to eliminate or drastically reduce many of the most severe and chronic social problems, such as social inequality, racism and crime. But as long as social engineering continues to be based upon a set of values that have been drawn more exclusively from the ideological left, this potential will go unrealized.

As long as the social sciences are dominated by people who have an ideologically polarized view of the world and a ideological agenda, or as long as the social sciences are dominated by people who want to promote ideals that are at odds with important elements of human nature, it is only to be expected that much of what they propose for our society will bear the imprint of this ideology. And, social scientists are in one of the best positions to know the power that socialization has to realize their ideals, over and above the objections of the people, and no matter how much these ideals conflict with aspects of human nature. But, what the social scientists fail to recognize is that in the degree that the social form which they succeed in creating is at odds with important aspects of human nature, it will tend to be unstable over time. The form of society that is based on the social scientists' ideals (i.e. humanism and liberal-progressive principles) will not be either maximally stable or robust over the longer term. And, from a more rational and ideologically neutral standpoint, one of the main objectives of social engineering should be to create a social form that is most lasting and most stable.

An Alternative View of Social Engineering
When legitimately practiced, or when conducted from a more ideologically neutral and synthetic point of view, one of the foremost aims of social engineering is to bring society into closer accord with principles that can be logically extrapolated from a correct understanding of human nature. Relatedly, and as I use the term "social engineering" in connection with this work, I mean a deliberate attempt to bring social arrangements into closer accord with the view of human nature that is now beginning to take shape as a result of advances in the behavioral and neurosciences. This is a view of human nature which, at certain points, is in conflict with the more idealistic view of human nature that continues to predominate in the social sciences.

As it has come to be more commonly understood, the term social engineering applies mainly to attempts by social scientists and fellow travelers to make human social institutions conform more closely with their ideals. Here at least, social scientists and I would appear to have a common cause. Like them, I also want to bring society into closer accord with my ideals. But, while they have mainly drawn their ideals from their "feelings" about what is right and best, I have extrapolated mine from what the behavioral sciences are revealing about human nature. While their social engineering project is based on an ideal view of human nature, and on the belief that socialization is the most important determinant of who we are, my alternative social engineering project is based on the belief that the more comprehensive understanding of human nature that is coming into view (due to advances in the behavioral and neurosciences), should be the primary basis from which we extrapolate principles for organizing human societies.

Even though the view of human nature that is now coming into view as a result of advance in the behavioral sciences is at odds with many of the liberal principles on which the "contemporary" social engineering project is based, one should not automatically infer from this that my "alternative" social engineering project is based on conservative principles. The picture of human nature that is now coming into view is much too complex to give unconditional support to either the ideological left or the ideological right. This more complex picture of human nature tends to support a set of ideals that is much more ideologically synthetic and diverse and which spans the full range of the ideological spectrum in its component parts. This view is in fact more "human" in the truest and most comprehensive sense of the word, because it reflects the full range of the normally occurring temperaments and abilities, rather than those which have become more exclusively associated with either the left or the right. That is, it tends to support a more "synthetic" view of man, or a view of man as a complex synthesis of potentially opposing tendencies and capacities.

The emerging view of human nature does not exclusively support either the ideological right or the ideological left. This view of human nature supports a set of values that is more eclectic and diverse than the value sets of either liberals or conservatives. It suggests that values that are more closely associated with both poles should be referenced in designing our societies, or should serve as the basis for any social engineering project that we might attempt. Yet, once again, the contemporary social engineering project is clearly dominated by values that are more closely associated with the ideological left.

So while my counterparts in the social sciences will continue to support a social engineering agenda that is based on false assumptions about human nature, in this work, we will propose a "radical" alternative to the contemporary social engineering project. Our alternative social engineering project will be designed to bring society into closer accord with those principles, values and ideals that can be logically extrapolated from the view of man that is now coming into view as a result of advances in the behavioral sciences, as opposed to the contemporary social engineering project, which is based upon principles, values and ideals that cannot be logically extrapolated from the most representative human tendencies (human nature at the aggregate level), and which therefore cannot appeal to dominant tendencies of human nature for their justification.

The Ideological Perspective of this Work
The conclusions about human nature which are now emerging from the behavioral sciences suggest that at some points, we should rely on principles for organizing our societies that are more closely associated with the ideological left; while at other points we should rely on principles that are more closely associated with the ideological right. As such, the "net" ideological standpoint which can be extrapolated from what the behavioral sciences have been reveling about human nature is net-neutral or "synthetic" Unfortunately, given the depth of their ideological illusions, it will be difficult to bring either liberals or conservatives around to this way of seeing things. Yet, considering all that is at stake, the attempt must be made.

Evolution endowed man with "two cognitive and temperamental poles," or two sets of opposing tendencies and capacities to enhance his survivability over a broad range of conditions. Certain values, attitudes and beliefs tend to be more closely associated with one temperamental pole than the other. And, in an attempt to remain true to the full repertoire of tendencies and capacities that we have been endowed with by our evolutionary legacy, we need to rely on values that are more closely associated with both poles as reference points in modeling human societies. If we choose to model our societies on the basis of values that are more closely associated with only one pole, to the near total exclusion of values that are more closely associated with the other pole, the resulting social form will tend to be unstable, and more prone to experience some kind of disintegration or collapse over the longer term.

From the standpoint of social engineering legitimately understood, our principal aim should be identify the system of values and beliefs that would be most functional and most conducive to human survivability as a basis for constructing human societies, or those values and beliefs that would be most likely to serve human interests at a societal level and over the longer term. And, evolution has already provided us with a general guide for how to do this in human nature. Contained in human nature is a blueprint for what has proven to be most conducive to our survivability at an aggregate level over the course of our evolution. That is, the process of evolution has endowed us with tendencies that have allowed us to overcome a wide range of challenges and that have been most conducive to our survivability over a broad range of conditions. Those tendencies which have collectively best equipped us to deal with challenges over the course of our evolution also best equip us to deal with the kinds of challenges that we are likely to face at the aggregate or species level over the longer term. A system of values that has been extrapolated from a correct understanding of human nature (an understanding of the full range of major tendencies that comprise human nature in the context of their evolutionary origins and functions ) will likely prove to be more conducive to our survivability. Such a system of values will tend to be a composite or a synthesis of values that are more closely associate with both poles. This is the system of values that underlies the perspective from which this work on social engineering has been written.

Even as this work has been written from a perspective that is hostile to both liberalism and conservatism, in their more monolithic forms, it is still written from an ideological perspective "of some kind." But, not all viewpoints are equal, simply because they involve a set of values attitudes and beliefs, or simply because they qualify as "ideological" in the most general sense. Depending on how "eclectic and synthetic" it is, depending on how closely it coincides with values and ideals that can be logically extrapolated from the view of human nature that is now being revealed by the behavioral sciences, a perspective, a world view or a belief system will be in either greater or lesser accord with human interests more generally.

If a belief system is based more or less exclusively on values that are more closely associated with one pole of human cognitive and temperamental essence, that belief system will give a distorted account of human interests and it will not prove maximally conducive to human survivability over the longer term. According to these criteria, liberalism and conservatism are both distorted ways of understanding human interests. For both belief systems tend to be dominated by values which are more exclusively associated with either one or the other pole of human cognitive and temperamental essence, or with one or the other poles of human nature, and which fail to adequately account for values that are more closely associated with the opposite pole. As such, and when standing alone, liberalism and conservatism reflect only part of human nature. Conversely, a more synthetic view will stand a better chance of being able to capture the totality of human interests and tendencies.

For practical purposes, Fascism on the right and Communism on the left have been marginalized and discredited. But, in their place, an ideology has emerged that has an even more pervasive influence on our lives and an even stronger hold on the masses than Communism or Fascism ever did. This is the ideology of liberal-progressive humanism, or simply liberalism. This is the ideology that serves as the basis for the contemporary social engineering project, and this is the ideology to which "this" work on social engineering is opposed. As a result of how far reaching and pervasive this ideology has become, and as a result of the overarching influence that it has been able to exert on life in the industrial societies of the West in particular, there is little doubt that liberals are now firmly in control of the ideological means of production. They have come to dominate the culture industry, the press, schools of journalism, the legal profession, government, and most importantly, for purposes of this work, they have come to dominate the social sciences. As a result, liberals are now in a position where they can have a major formative influence on an entire generation.

Before the people who have been most captivated by the liberal-progressive-humanist world view can be persuaded to relinquish it, it will be necessary for the flaws in their ideology to become more apparent. Along with conservatives, they will need for their ideologies to be "disconfirmed." This disconfirmation may only come about as the result of a tragic sequence of events. That is to say, as a civilization, we may have to run onto the rocks before a majority of the people will become convinced that we have been on the wrong course. But, by running onto the rocks, great damage is likely to be done to the ship of state. There may be substantial loss of life and property involved. Still, a catastrophic collapse of the current system may be the only thing that is capable of disconfirming the prevailing ideologies and breaking the spell that they have over the people. Such a collapse may ultimately prove to be the only thing that will get a majority of the people to do what they should have done long ago, which was to abandon any commitments they have had to the outmoded and dysfunctional ideologies of liberalism and conservatism in favor of a more eclectic and synthetic ideology. This is the belief system that can be logically extrapolated from the more comprehensive and accurate understanding of human nature that is now coming into view as a result of advances that have been recently made in the behavioral sciences. This is the belief system that is more consistent with human nature at the aggregate level. This is the belief system which promises to do a much better job of advancing human interests more generally, than the polar ideologies (liberalism and conservatism). Ultimately, such a synthetic belief system (one which draws its core principles and values from "both" poles of human cognitive and temperamental essence, or human nature) is the only legitimate basis from which to practice social engineering.

Summary
In its contemporary usage, the term "social engineering" has become virtually synonymous with elitism, and with attempts by liberal academics to foist their vision of what society should look like upon a general public that wavers between being compliant and unsuspecting on the one hand, and openly skeptical and resentful of them on the other. When most people hear the term social engineering, it conjures up images of social scientists (particularly those at Northern, elite, ivy league universities) with their entourage of young, fawning, idealistic student admirers attempting to promote (if not impose) their ideals about how our society should be organized. Invariably, these ideals have a closer association with the ideological left. And, this is the perspective that has come to dominate the social sciences. In addition to describing themselves as liberals, most social scientists will describe themselves as either "progressives" or "humanists." Due to the fact that there tends to be considerable overlap in the values and world views associated with the ideologies of liberalism, progressivism and humanism, these labels can be applied somewhat interchangeably. Collectively, these belief systems form an ideological complex that is more closely associated with what we might call the "left" pole of human nature. The values and ideals that collectively influence the world views of those who define themselves as either liberals, progressives or humanists provide the fundamental basis for the contemporary social engineering project.

The Ideological Perspective of this Work
From the standpoint of social engineering legitimately understood, our principal aim should be identify the system of values and beliefs that would be most functional and most conducive to human survivability as a basis for constructing human societies, or those values and beliefs that would be most likely to serve human interests at a societal level and over the longer term. And, evolution has already provided us with a general guide for how to do this in human nature. Contained in human nature is a blueprint for what has proven to be most conducive to our survivability at an aggregate level over the course of our evolution. That is, the process of evolution has endowed us with tendencies that have allowed us to overcome a wide range of challenges and that have been most conducive to our survivability over a broad range of conditions. And those tendencies which have collectively best equipped us to deal with challenges over the course of our evolution also best equip us to deal with the kinds of challenges that we are likely to face at the aggregate or species level over the longer term. A system of values that has been extrapolated from a correct understanding of human nature (an understanding of the full range of major tendencies that comprise human nature in the context of their evolutionary origins and functions ) will be more likely to prove conducive to our survivability. Such a system of values will tend to be a composite or a synthesis of values that are more closely associate with both poles. This is the system of values that underlies the perspective from which this work on social engineering has been written.